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The United States prides itself as a nation that offers equity and opportunity to its 
citizens. However, in recent decades, regions of relative wealth and poverty have come to define 
the American landscape. According to U.S. Census Data, coastal communities have fared well 
with consistently declining rates of unemployment and increasing rates of college graduation 
(U.S. Census Bureau, 2016; U.S Census Bureau, 2018). In contrast, Central Appalachia, which 
comprises parts of Kentucky, Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia, continues to falter with 
diverging employment and income levels relative to other areas of the country. Central 
Appalachia’s 7.3% unemployment rate is nearly 2 percentage points greater than the nation, and 
its household income is only 62% of the U.S. average (U.S. Census Bureau, 2017). Thus, this 
report’s problem is motivated by left-behind Americans’ plight in the face of hardening 
boundaries between coastal cities and rural areas. 
Policy Question 
 Why do Central Appalachian counties continue to exhibit widespread poverty, whereas 
counties in other subregions, particularly northern Appalachian, demonstrate relatively high 
economic development levels (with a poverty level of 24% Central and 14.1% in North 
Appalachia) (U.S. Census Bureau, 2017)? In order to address this question, I will discuss the 
economic history of the region and consider three case studies, concentrated in McDowell, 
Harrison, and Chenango counties, to highlight both economically distressed and promising areas 
within Appalachia. McDowell County, located in southwestern West Virginia, has one of the 
nation’s highest poverty rates and the nation’s lowest life expectancy (I.H.M.E., 2016). By 
contrast, the economic transitions of Harrison County in West Virginia and Chenango County in 
New York provide a framework for developing a diverse Appalachian economy. Based on 
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findings from these case studies and a comprehensive literature review, I will conclude by 
proposing a research design to evaluate a place-based economic development initiative’s success 
in ameliorating low economic outcomes.  
The History of Appalachia 
Overview 
 Appalachia comprises 420 counties across 13 states, spanning from southern New York 
to northern Mississippi (ARC, 2020). Twenty-five million Americans live within the region, 
42% of which is considered rural. In 1963, at Appalachian governors’ request, President John F. 
Kennedy formed the President’s Appalachian Regional Commission to assess the region’s needs. 
Citing 1960 U.S. Census data, the Commission published a report that nearly one-third of the 
area’s population lived under the poverty line compared with about 1 in 5 nationwide. Indeed, 
the 1964 PARC report provided the basis for establishing the Appalachian Regional Commission 
(ARC) in 1965. The ARC, one of the most extensive place-based regional development 
programs, has since invested over $4.5 billion into Appalachian communities with the principal 
goal of achieving socioeconomic parity with the rest of the nation. Federal, state, and local 
funding has matched this funding by more than $10 billion.  
 Despite these significant expenditures, Appalachia still lags behind the rest of the nation. 
The divergence is particularly acute in the Central region, which contains Appalachia’s most 
mountainous terrain (Baumann, 2006). The area historically relied upon extractive industries, 
including logging and coal mining, as important income sources. In fact, 33.8% of West 
Virginians in 1990 were employed in logging and mining, declining to 18.6% by 2020 (U.S. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2020). Appalachian coal production and employment have faced 
decades of steady declines from a zenith in the 1940s, penalizing the pockets of the region 
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(primarily concentrated in eastern Kentucky and southwestern West Virginia) that relied upon 
the coal industry for employment (West Virginia Office of Mine Health and Safety, 2020). These 
declines became even more pronounced following the coal bust in the 1980s (Black, McKinnish, 
and Sanders, 2005): rural Central Appalachia’s per capita household median income is now just 
three-quarters of the greater region’s income and just over half of the nation’s (U.S. Census 
Bureau, 2017). Whereas Appalachia’s overall poverty rate decreased by 3 percent (on par with 
the country), the Central and North Central sub-regions endured a 2 percent increase from 2012 
to 2017. 
Perspectives on Appalachian Poverty 
The broad economic literature on spatial heterogeneity across the United States often 
overlooks the Appalachian region, despite its large population and substantial divergence from 
the rest of the nation on several key factors. Since the mid-twentieth century, a smaller collection 
of Appalachian scholars has attempted to define the social, economic, and political factors 
contributing to Central Appalachia’s “distressed” status. Night Comes to the Cumberlands, 
written by Harry M. Caudill in 1963, represents the first serious attempt at identifying the drivers 
behind the region’s poverty; his work, in part, highlighted the importance of a place-based 
program to address the region’s needs (Jaworski and Kitchens, 2019). He tells the story of an 
impoverished, unhealthy population, overwhelmed by outside businesses that extract Central 
Appalachia’s rich coal resources and export them elsewhere (Caudill, 1963). Since his account of 
Appalachian poverty, other theories have arisen to identify the reasons behind the region’s 
depravity.  
Lohmann (1990) synthesizes these theories into several bodies of thought, three of which 
I will consider: “bureaucratic realism,” “Appalachian culturalism,” and “domestic colonialism.” 
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Bureaucratic realism describes the public agency view, where Appalachia is a congressionally 
defined region requiring the same economic development policies as any other impoverished 
region. For instance, Empowerment Zones provide federal tax incentives and other financial 
benefits for businesses and workers located in certain areas (McDonald, 1997). The ARC 
“growth center” approach is another part of this strategy, where policymakers advocate for new 
highway corridors as a means of spurring growth (Lohmann, 1990).  
Appalachia culturalism, on the other hand, purports that poverty in Appalachia cannot be 
overcome with development strategies that are applied to other areas of the U.S. Weller (1995) 
argues that Appalachian culture, concentrated in the Central Appalachian region, breeds 
residents with a unique complacency for isolation and poverty. He posits that general 
hopelessness creates a self-perpetuating cycle where young, uneducated parents birth more 
children than they can support, all of whom learn to subsist on government welfare. While 
Weller generalizes in broad strokes, others (Billings, 1974; Irelan, 1966) support the theory that 
Appalachian culture influences persistent poverty in the region. Although this report does not 
seek to analyze the psychological factors influencing Central Appalachia’s relative depravity, 
policymakers will need to consider the “Appalachian culturalism” theory when designing an 
effective place-based economic development policy.  
Lastly, domestic colonialism views Appalachia as a colony within the United States, 
where rich natural resources are exported to other parts of the nation by outside firms with 
“maximum cost and minimum gain” to the state (Lohmann, 1990). This body of thought asserts 
that absentee ownership creates a vacuum that shapes the state’s economic institutions around 
too few industries; the demise of those industries, without notable replacements, thus deprives 
people of jobs. While I will attempt to understand the drivers contributing toward Central 
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Appalachian poverty, without a means of empirically proving one theory’s veracity over another, 
I can only submit that the reality likely lies within a combination of the three approaches. 
However, I will emphasize the domestic colonialism concept, known more commonly as the 
“resource curse,” as that has the most established precedent in the developmental economic 
literature (Auty, 1993). In doing so, I will analyze the history of coal mining in Central 
Appalachia and the implications of mining’s prevalence on the region’s outcomes.  
Resource Curse: Literature Review 
 How can a region with plentiful natural resources experience such acute levels of 
poverty? One might expect that abundant raw resources would elevate an area’s wealth level, 
encouraging investment and economic growth. The “resource curse,” a phrase coined by Richard 
Auty in 1993, describes an area where resource wealth undermines that area’s population’s 
economic well-being. Sachs and Warner (1995) note that economies with abundant natural 
resources generally grow slower than economies with scarce resources. To test this theory, they 
analyze the relationship between resource intensity and growth. Sachs and Warner compare 
economies with high and low ratios of natural resource exports to GDP over nineteen years 
(1970-1989). Their evidence yields a significant negative relationship between resource intensity 
and growth, even after controlling for exogenous variables that may affect growth (e.g., per 
capita income). Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) offer further insight into this paradox by arguing 
that either inclusive or exclusive economic institutions can spur economic growth. Inclusive 
economic institutions encourage the free entry of business, secure property rights laws, and 
“opportunity” for most citizens. Such opportunities include a relatively level playing field to 
ensure that one interest does not crowd out the others. On the other hand, exclusive economic 
institutions are designed by powerful entities with the goal of extracting resources from other 
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economic agents. They further claim that these inclusive or exclusive economic institutions form 
symbiotic synergies with either pluralist (e.g., Norway) or absolutist political systems (e.g., 
Venezuela).  
The developmental economic literature has increasingly considered economic 
complexity, resulting from interactions between multiple economic agents, as an essential driver 
of development (Hidalgo and Hausmann, 2009). Hidalgo and Hausmann (2009) assess country 
product associations by analyzing import/export data; they find a robust negative relationship 
between the number of products exported by a country and the ubiquity of those products (the 
number of countries exporting the same product). Their analysis also yields a strong positive 
correlation between export complexity and income per capita as well as future growth 
propensity. Although Central Appalachia no longer produces as much coal as it once did, the 
coal industry’s past predominance as a major extractive agent can contextualize the region’s 
present-day woes. According to the literature, areas that historically rely on a few extractive 
industries as a primary source of income constrain the on-the-job skills that area-residents 
acquire (Hausmann et al., 2014).  
On the other hand, an area with economic complexity affords workers a broader range of 
knowledge and, thus, employment opportunities: Hausmann et al., (2014) draw a statistically 
significant positive relationship between cognitive ability and economic complexity. Moreover, 
Goetz et al., (2019) identify a positive correlation between industry diversity and economic 
resilience in congruence with these findings, suggesting a community is likelier to overcome an 
economic shock if it produces a more diverse array of goods. Having established the importance 
of inclusive economic institutions that facilitate complex interactions between agents, I will 
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consider the history of coal mining in Central Appalachia, where coal remains the region’s top 
export (U.S. Census Bureau, 2019). 
Coal Mining in Appalachia 
Coal mining has a particularly rich history in West Virginia, the only state located 
entirely within Appalachia. West Virginia is second only to Wyoming in U.S. coal production 
and accounts for 12% of total coal production in the U.S. (U.S. Energy Information 
Administration, 2020). The construction of railroads between 1880 and 1920 unbridled a period 
of significant transformation within Central Appalachia, transitioning the economic landscape 
from agrarian to capitalist modes of production (Nesbitt, 2019). During the early twentieth 
century, absentee-owned lumber companies advantaged from easy access to the railroad, killing 
most of West Virginia’s virgin forests. With the exhaustion of Central Appalachia’s timber 
resources, coal mining became the primary economic activity by 1920. The coal and railroad 
companies subsequently won land and mineral rights to 80% of southern West Virginia during 
the following decade. Rasmussen (1994) argues that this “insecurity in landownership” 
differentiated early twentieth century farmers from farmers elsewhere in the heartland. The farms 
in southern West Virginia, eastern Kentucky, and southwest Virginia were often replaced with 
company-owned coal camps (Eller, 1982). Unlike other parts of Appalachia and the Midwest, 
most miners—79% in southern West Virginia and 64% in eastern Kentucky/southwest 
Virginia—lived in such company towns by 1910. In addition to supplying miners with homes, 
the companies created all the necessary institutions to run the town (Lewis, 1993). Mine 
operators thus orchestrated the general store, church, post office, and entertainment 
establishments. This relationship continued into the late twentieth century. The Appalachian 
Land Task Force (1983) found that “for many Appalachian people, coal camp life is not a 
 9 
bygone era. Facing no alternative, people remain, often dependent upon the will and wishes of 
the company landlord. In staying, they face insecurities of tenure, dilapidated housing, and fear 
of the company’s power.” 
 However, despite the industry’s long-time association with the Appalachian region, coal 
mine employment has declined since the mid-twentieth century (West Virginia Office of Mine 
Health and Safety, 2020). Much like in other sectors, mine owners replaced employees with 
mechanized equipment, such as longwall mining machines, beginning in the 1950s. Whereas 
125,669 West Virginians were employed as miners in 1948, only 19,432 of the population 
remained miners by 2013. Eastern Kentucky and southern West Virginia, an area once home to 
most Appalachian company towns, is now Appalachia’s most distressed region (ARC, 2020). 
For example, McDowell County is one of the most impoverished counties in the country; in 
1950, the area boasted a population of nearly 100,000 residents, dwindling to less than 20,000 
residents by 2019 (Rudd et al., 2016). 
In addition to mechanization, several other factors can account for the industry’s long-run 
downturn. The 1970s Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) oil embargo 
increased coal’s price, temporarily uplifting coal mine communities (Black, McKinnish, and 
Sanders, 2005). However, by 1983, oil prices declined significantly, reversing the boom’s 
effects; the devastation was coupled by Western coal mines that further mechanized mining 
techniques, driving down coal costs. Black, McKinnish, and Sanders (2005) evaluate the spill-
overs generated by coal jobs in Central Appalachia and find that one mining job during a boom 
yields 0.174 local jobs. The loss of one mining job during a bust erases 0.349 local jobs. The coal 
industry’s death knell has nearly been cemented over the last decade because of cheaper 
substitutes and market saturation. After coal consumption and production peaked in the U.S. at 
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1-1.1 billion tons in 2007, consumption declined to 650 million tons by 2017 (Mendelevitch, 
Hauenstein, and Holz, 2019). The proliferation of natural gas between 2007 and 2017, where 
production increased by 45%, significantly decreased natural gas prices as an energy source. 
Likewise, the share of renewable forms of electricity generation increased from 2.5% to 10% 
during that period, as preferences shifted from coal in favor of solar and wind sources. 
Furthermore, mine companies’ speculation regarding skyrocketing Asian demand encouraged 
investment in costly, new assets, resulting in the overproduction of coal. The subsequent market 
saturation bankrupted both large and small firms operating in Appalachia. 50% of mining jobs in 
the region vanished between 2011 and 2016.  
The Current State of Appalachia 
Overview 
To assess economic fortitude, the ARC relies upon an index-based classification system 
with five different designations: distressed, at-risk, transitional, competitive, and attainment 
(ARC, 2020). Three indicators inform these designations: three-year average unemployment rate, 
per capita market income, and poverty rate. As demonstrated by figure I., almost all Central 
Appalachian counties are either distressed (among the worst 10% in the nation) or at-risk 
(between 10% and 25% worst in the nation). None have reached attainment (ranking in the best 








     
 Source: Appalachian Regional Commission (2020) 
Several key characteristics differentiate Central Appalachia from other impoverished 
parts of the nation. For instance, before the ARC’s establishment, a large portion of Appalachia 
was geographically isolated from the rest of the Eastern Seaboard. The formidable mountainous 
terrain retarded easy access to the area’s cities and towns. Indeed, Redding and Venables (2004) 
test for the effect of geographic isolation on trade, equity flows, direct investment, and 
technology. They find that the aforementioned economic interactions decrease with distance, 
finding that clustering facilitates economic growth. The 1964 PARC report concluded that, 
“developmental activity in Appalachia cannot proceed until the regional isolation has been 
overcome. Its cities and towns, its areas of natural wealth and its areas of recreations and 
industrial potential must be penetrated by a transportation network which provides access to and 
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from the rest of the Nation and within the region itself” (PARC, 1964). The ARC hence designed 
the Appalachian Development Highway System—a now-3,090 mile-long network of roadways, 
comprised of Interstates and state routes—to mitigate Central Appalachia’s isolation (Jaworski 
and Kitchens, 2019). The new highway system replaced the narrow, meandering and ill-
maintained two-lane roads that provided the only means of travel from town-to-town. Jaworski 
and Kitchens (2019) examine the efficacy of the ARC’s infrastructure initiative by comparing 
income data for ARC and bordering non-ARC counties. They estimate a counterfactual scenario 
where the fall in trade costs equates to about $54 billion without a highway system. While the 
issue of geographical isolation has at least been partially addressed with targeted development 
policy, more foundational problems remain. 
 Appalachia is notable for its low labor force participation rates, which mask the severity 
of unemployment relative to the rest of the nation. Central Appalachia’s unemployment rate in 
2017 stood at 7.3%, slightly higher than the U.S.’ 5.4% unemployment rate (U.S. Census 
Bureau, 2017). However, while the nation’s average labor participation rate is 63.9%, West 
Virginia’s is the lowest in the nation at 52.9% (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2020). Central 
Appalachia also diverges from the rest of the nation in educational attainment. 22% of area 
residents lacked a high school diploma (compared to 12.7 in the U.S.), and only 13.8% achieved 
a bachelor’s degree or higher (in contrast with 30.9% in the U.S.) (U.S. Census Bureau, 2017). 
While the resource curse explanation contextualizes the current state of poverty in Appalachia, it 
offers an incomplete picture of factors that describe the present-day situation. High out-migration 
(particularly of young, educated residents) as well as low labor force participation characterize 
critical issues that the region must address in order to spur sustained, intensive economic growth. 
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Appalachian Migration Trends 
 The Appalachian Region’s net migration rate was negative during the 1980s, fueled in 
part by deindustrialization and the transition to capital intensive technology (McLaughlin et al., 
1999). Deindustrialization primarily affected the Northern sub-region, whereas the technological 
shift impacted the Central sub-region by reducing employment and wages in mining areas. In 
fact, Central Appalachia experienced the region’s weakest growth at -1% per year through the 
late 1980s. The greater Appalachian region endured a negative net-migration rate of 410,000 
residents during this period (Litcher et al., 2005). However, upon closer analyzation of county-
level data, the spatial heterogeneity of the region becomes apparent. The Southern sub-region 
demonstrated relatively strong growth, primarily in suburban counties that border growing 
metropolitan areas, including Atlanta, Asheville, and Spartanburg. Conversely, the counties 
defined as Transitional and Distressed by the ARC generally witnessed rapidly declining 
populations. Only 30% of these areas witnessed net in-migration from 1980 to 1989. 
Furthermore, merely 18% of rural counties (not connected to urban or suburban counties) 
experienced net in-migration. 
 Out-migration from Northern and Central Appalachia notably occurred across specific 
age and education demographics. From 1985 to 1990, adults aged 25 to 39, key members of the 
prime-age demographic, moved away in greater numbers than those of the same age group who 
moved to the two regions (McLaughlin et al., 1999). Those aged 75 and over also left the 
Northern and Central Appalachian areas; only the 55 to 64 age group demonstrated a net in-
migration rate. On the contrary, the Southern sub-region witnessed growth across all groups. In 
particular, metropolitan counties in Georgia, especially those in the Atlanta area, attracted the 
region’s highest net in-migration of aged 25 to 39 individuals.  
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The Northern and Central regions also suffered from net-losses in college graduates, 
though the Northern area was more successful in retaining those with high school diplomas. 
Distressed and Transitional counties lost college educated residents, whereas competitive 
counties gained 17 college-educated residents per 100 people between 1985 and 1990. As has 
been discussed, these distressed counties are primarily located in Central Appalachia; in fact, .74 
per 100 people with college degrees left the Central Appalachian area during this period. 
However, all regions experienced an in-migration of individuals with less than a high school 
diploma.   
While population growth improved somewhat in the following decade, this growth was 
primarily driven by the Southern sub-region (Litcher et al., 2005). Northern and Central 
Appalachia demonstrated positive, albeit small, growth rates of .06% and .54%. By the early 
2000s, this promising milieu dissipated, with Northern Appalachia again demonstrating negative 
population growth and Central Appalachia experiencing a growth rate of only .2%. This 
downward trend has continued into the twenty-first century. From 2010 to 2016, the Central 
Appalachian Region bore the weakest population growth at -2.2% with the Northern sub-region 
following at -1.8% (Pollard et al., 2018). Rural Appalachia (all Appalachian counties non-
adjacent to metropolitan areas) witnessed the most staggering decreases, losing 1.7% of its 
population from six years prior.   
This geographic sorting across age and education demographics is supported by the labor 
market and economic development literature. Zaiceva (2014) analyzes patterns from global and 
U.S. studies to assess the relationship between aging and migration. She finds a negative 
relationship between aging and migration once workers are over 30 years old. She suggests this 
to be an important discovery, given that when individuals in the 20 to 30 year old age group 
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migrate away, regions tend to lose their most productive workers. Whitaker (2019) studies U.S. 
Census data, observing that younger cohorts, specifically the millennial generation (born from 
1980 to 1996), flowed from nonurban to urban areas on net from 2000 to 2015. Urban 
populations have risen largely because the growth in millennial population has occurred as more 
seniors choose to age-in-place; over time, this has led to greater stratification of age groups 
across rural (older) and urban (younger) areas. Consistent with these findings, more rural Central 
and North Appalachia have higher median ages (41.8 and 42.6) than the U.S. as a whole (38) 
(Pollard et al., 2018). Large Appalachian metros boast a median age of 39.5, more consistent 
with U.S. metrics. 
Berry and Glaeser (2005) analyze migration data across the U.S. from the 1970s, 1980s, 
and 1990s. They find increasing regional segregation by skill with college-educated individuals 
concentrating in metropolitan areas. Glaeser and Saiz (2004) identify important implications to 
increasing a locality’s human capital, namely substantial income and population growth. On the 
other hand, low-skilled worker in-migration has declined over time to metropolitan areas, which 
Austin et al., (2018) attribute to more inelastic housing supply. Increasing housing costs in these 
urban areas, therefore, may contribute to the hardening boundary between low-skill and high-
skill areas. The lack of meaningful economic development and job growth likely play critical 
roles in compelling younger, more educated workers, who can afford these housing costs, to 
leave the Central Appalachian region. 
Appalachian Labor Force Participation 
Abraham and Keary (2018) conclude that labor-demand factors contribute to the 
heterogenous nature of nonemployment rates for U.S counties. For instance, they identify foreign 
competition and technological advancement as factors that led to declining prime-age male labor 
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force participation rates during the early 21st century. Furthermore, Austin et al., (2018) study 
changes in wages and in male nonemployment rates at the public use microdata area (PUMA) 
level (1980 to 2010), finding a strong negative correlation between wage growth and male 
nonemployment. In particular, they observe that PUMAs with rising nonemployment have 
endured significant average wage declines over time. Consistent with this observation, Central 
Appalachia suffers from historically low income growth. In 2018, the region lagged behind the 
national average by 4 percentage points (1.8% versus 5.8%) (Pollard et al., 2018). Baumann 
(2006) assesses the historic Appalachian wage gap and concludes that increasing returns to 
college degrees in the 1980s coupled with low regional educational attainment account for the 
widening gap between Appalachia and the nation. Indeed, Austin et al., extrapolate that 1980 
education data (the percent of male residents with high school and college diplomas) can account 
for 34% of the variation in 2010 male nonemployment across PUMAs, where less educated areas 
demonstrate higher nonemployment. When controlling for individual and historical area 
education level, the nonemployment gap between the Eastern Heartland (which encompasses 
Appalachia) and the coasts disappears. The relatively low wage growth and education levels of 
Appalachian adults, therefore, may frame the region’s weak labor force participation rate.  
Low labor force participation is hardly a new problem in Central Appalachia. In 1990, the 
number of non-participant Central Appalachian males (over 16) was 12.2 percentage points 
higher than non-participant males in the rest of the U.S. (Rogers, 1990). According to 2000 data, 
Central Appalachian labor force participation diverged from the nation by more than 3%. ARC-
defined “distressed” counties had particularly low labor force participation rates, which fell 
below the national average by over 12% (Carrozza, 2004).   
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While labor force participation has declined nationwide, especially among prime-age 
men following the Great Recession, low labor force participation persists in Central Appalachia 
(Austin et al., 2018). Economists frequently debate the drivers behind declining labor force 
participation rates; the two primary schools of thought can be characterized by what James 
Bullard (2014), chair of the St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank, describes as the "Bad Omen" view 
and the "Demographics" view. The "Bad Omen" literature portends that declining labor force 
participation will affect future U.S. macroeconomic performance because workers are frustrated 
with the economy. Conversely, the "Demographics" literature argues that as the U.S. population 
ages, especially as members of the Baby Boomer generation retire, the labor force participation 
rate will change to reflect these demographic adjustments. When performing the case study 
analysis, I will consider how accurately these views describe Central Appalachian counties. 
Appalachian Case Studies 
I will now examine three case studies to evaluate the developmental issues endemic to the 
Central Appalachian region and how those issues can be surmounted. Data collected by Han and 
Goetz (2015) guide my selection of distressed and “resilient” counties. The index calculates 
resilience as a measure of economic decline relative to expected employment and the subsequent 
recovery (if any) relative to the point of lowest employment after the shock (see figure II.). 
Expected employment is the region’s long-run growth trajectory at the onset of a recessionary 
shock. Additionally, Han and Goetz’s index assesses a county’s ability to reject and recuperate 
from an economic shock, using data from the 2007-2009 downturn. The first case study, 
McDowell County, demonstrates low economic resilience (declining with no recovery). In 
contrast, Harrison County in West Virginia (North Central Appalachia) and Chenango County in 
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New York (Northern Appalachia) exhibit relatively high regional resilience scores of .794 and 
.75, respectively, which are among the ten highest in Appalachia (Goetz et al., 2019). 
Figure II. 
 
Source: Han and Goetz (2015) 
 
Distressed County Case Study: McDowell 
Background 
 McDowell County, a rural, mountainous area, is located in the coalfields of southern 
West Virginia (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010). Welch, the largest town in the County, is only 
accessible by a two-lane state roadway, like every other area-town. Coal mining has long been 
the primary source of economic activity in the County, with about 19.62% of the working 
population still employed as coal miners in 2012 (West Virginia Office of Mine Health and 
Safety, 2020). The industry’s importance to the area’s economic landscape can be traced to the 
1880s. Pocahontas Fuel Company and U.S. Steel, recognizing southern West Virginia’s high-
quality coal, established mines and mining towns in the area by acquiring land and mineral rights 
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to thousands of acres (Moore, 1998). By the 1980s, energy and steel companies owned 86% of 
County land with mineral resources. In 2011, four companies controlled land rights to more than 
50% of all private land in McDowell County, offering some credence to the absentee ownership 
“Domestic Colonialism” hypothesis (West Virginia Center on Budget and Policy, 2013).  
Economic hardship and social upheaval have come to define McDowell County; despite 
that, some residents remain resolute in their commitment to the County’s economic development, 
claiming a strong sense of regional identity. Marsha Timpson, the executive director of a local 
community service non-profit, states, "Our coal forged the steel that built the nation. . .I am very 
connected to these mountains. This will always be home" (Sheldon, 2013). She likens Central 
Appalachia to America’s backyard, the area where one accomplishes necessary but, at times, 
unpleasant hard-work. However, not all residents look favorably upon the region’s coal industry. 
Ellis Ray Williams, a retired educator and principal, recounts his advisor at West Virginia 
University telling him to avoid settling in Welch because the economy relied on one industry. 
Williams believes that the region’s politicians have capitalized too long on supporting coal 
mining without incentivizing the development of auxiliary industries. He concludes that this 
mindset facilitates a "brain drain" in southern Appalachia, where most young adults who leave 
the County for college do not return because of the lack of jobs outside coal mining. Indeed, the 
economic research firm, Chmura, developed an Economic Diversity Index (ranging from a high 
of 1 to a low of 180) to assess the range of economic activity on a county-level (Chmura 
Economics & Analytics, 2020). McDowell County’s 126.45 index value is among the lowest in 
West Virginia; the area places in the bottom 7th percentile for relative industrial diversity (where 
the dominant industry is natural resource extraction) and bottom 6th percentile for relative 
occupational diversity (Center for Regional Economic Competitiveness, 2012). I will thus 
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consider both demographic and economic trends that can explain McDowell County’s present-
day distressed status. 
Demographic Trends 
McDowell County has suffered decades of population declines, low educational 
attainment, prescription-drug abuse, and low life expectancy. The population reached a peak of 
nearly 100,000 residents in 1950, falling to 22,113 by 2010 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010). Only 
64.9% of residents had at least a high school diploma while a meager 5.2% had a bachelor’s 
degree or more, the lowest in the Appalachian region (U.S. Census Bureau, 2016). Furthermore, 
the male substance use disorder mortality rate grew to 72.5% in 2014. This 610% increase from 
1980 is significantly higher than the national rate of 18.7%. In 2015, drug deaths eclipsed every 
other County in the United States, with 141 deaths per 100,000 residents (Rudd et al., 2016). 
Keyes et al., (2014) offer one explanation for the high rate of drug use in West Virginia, positing 
that aging areas like McDowell, where the percent of individuals over 65 exceeds those under 
18, have a deteriorating economic infrastructure, leading to an adverse selection effect (U.S. 
Census Bureau, 2019): those with higher academic aspirations leave the County, whereas those 
who stay behind in an economically depressed area, are likelier to establish drug dependencies 
(Keyes et al., 2014). This high susceptibility to drug use may contextualize the fact that males in 
McDowell County have a life expectancy almost ten years shorter than the national life 
expectancy (67 versus 76.7 for males in 2014) (I.H.M.E., 2016). Currently, little academic 
research assesses the prevalence of drug-induced deaths in rural areas like McDowell County, 
though Nandi et al., (2010) observe an inverse correlation between economic deprivation and 
drug use cessation when analyzing injection drug use and income data from a cohort study in 
Baltimore City, Maryland. Though this report does not seek to evaluate the drivers behind the 
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complicated relationship between drug use and poverty, high drug use rates create a substantial 
economic barrier for Central Appalachian counties. McDowell County’s abnormally low labor 
force participation rate (28.5%) may offer insight into how the drug epidemic has affected the 
local labor force (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2020). French et al., (2001) support this 
conclusion, relying on the 1997 National Household Survey on Drug Abuse to draw a significant 
negative relation between chronic drug use and male labor force participation. 
Economic Trends 
McDowell County significantly lags behind the nation based on income, poverty, 
employment, and labor force participation. The County only has a $15,378 per capita market 
income (P.C.M.I.), a mere 33.9% of the U.S.’ P.C.M.I. (U.S. Census Bureau, 2018). McDowell 
County also has one of the highest poverty rates in the United States: more than 1 in 3 residents 
live under the poverty line, and some 34% of residents qualified for food stamp (SNAP) benefits 
(U.S. Census Bureau, 2018). Relatively high unemployment levels can partially explain 
McDowell’s high levels of impoverishment. Figure III demonstrates how McDowell’s 
unemployment rate has consistently been higher than the U.S.’ rate (with two brief exceptions in 
2009 and 2020). 
Furthermore, during the early 1990s, early 2000s, and the Great Recession, the effects on 
unemployment for McDowell were consistently more pronounced than for the nation as a whole. 
For instance, from January 1990 to their respective peaks, the U.S. unemployment rate grew by 
2.4 points, but the McDowell County unemployment rate rose by 11.1 points. This finding, 
consistent with Han and Goetz’s (2015) observations, suggests that McDowell County is less 
resilient to economic shocks than the rest of the country on average. According to figure IV, 
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following the Great Recession, McDowell County’s labor force contracted by nearly 1,500 















Figure IV.  
 
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics  
McDowell County’s labor force participation rate is the second-lowest in Appalachia at 
28.8%, less than half the nation’s participation rate (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2020). 
McDowell County’s low labor force participation is likely symptomatic of both the 
aforementioned “Bad Omen” and “Demographic” views. The area has an aging population, 
which will naturally lead to decreased participation as the older demographic retires. However, 
this view only addresses a part of the story because the share of prime-age adults in the County’s 
workforce has also decreased considerably. For instance, the participation rate for adults aged 25 
to 44 declined from 50.7% in 2010 to 42.3% in 2019 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2019). Other factors, 
including the limited number of employment opportunities and aforementioned drug abuse, may 
discourage the work force. Having identified a distressed Central Appalachian County’s 
characteristics, I will now analyze two case studies in the greater Appalachian region that offer a 
template for sustained, intensive economic growth.  
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Resilient County Case Study: Harrison 
Background 
Harrison County is a part-urban (63%), part-rural (37%) county located in the low hills of 
northwestern West Virginia (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010). Like McDowell County, Harrison has 
abundant coal reserves. Following a visit to the County’s seat, Clarksburg, Howe (1845) 
remarked, "there are inexhaustible supplies of coal in the immediate neighborhood and being in 
the midst of a fertile country possessing great mineral wealth in its iron, salt, etc., it possesses the 
elements of prosperity." By 1840, area miners produced over 200,000 bushels of coal annually 
(U.S. Census Bureau, 1841). While resource extraction once constituted an important component 
of Harrison County’s historic economic growth, the local economy now demonstrates far greater 
economic diversity than McDowell County: Harrison County boasts an economic diversity index 
score of 76.49, where U.S. counties on average possessed a value of 97.9, indicating that 
Harrison bests the national average (Chmura Economics & Analytics, 2020). The County places 
in the 76th percentile for relative industry diversity and the 95th percentile for occupation 
diversity (Center for Regional Economic Competitiveness, 2012). Although 786 coal miners still 
worked in Harrison County in 1990 (less than 1% of the area’s labor force), by 2019, all of the 
County’s mines were closed (West Virginia Office of Mine Health and Safety, 2020). Instead, 
35.6% of the workforce held occupations in management, business, science, and arts occupations 
(educators often make up most of the latter category) while 22.1% worked in sales and office-
related roles (U.S. Census Bureau, 2019).  
Harrison County’s two largest towns, Clarksburg and Bridgeport, are located next to the 
interstate highway that leads to the state capital. While each has dedicated economic 
development authorities, Clarksburg has a particularly diversified economy with two major 
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medical centers, a U.S. District Court, and an FBI division (Boetnner et al., 2019). Nearby, 
prominent employers, including West Virginia University and Mylan Pharmaceuticals, 
contribute to the area’s resilience. Other small-scale efforts have been made to reinvigorate the 
area following several decades of population declines. For example, Clarksburg offers grants to 
property owners for building restoration and awards tax incentives to businesses that locate in 
certain depressed areas of the city (City of Clarksburg, 2021). Additionally, "Healthy Harrison" 
provides County-based health and wellness businesses with resources to improve their 
community recognition. The establishment of the Bridgeport Farmer’s Market also encouraged 
local farmers and businesses, leading to storefronts’ return to the downtown area. Moreover, 
Clarksburg’s city purchased the once-abandoned Robinson Grand Performing arts center to 
provide area-residents with a community center—an attempt to improve Harrison County 
residents’ quality of life. 
Demographic Trends 
 Harrison County has stabilized several decades of population declines. It offers education 
attainment rates in West Virginia’s top quartile, lower than state-average drug abuse, and a life 
expectancy on par with the state. The County’s population peaked in 1950 at 85,296, falling to 
69,371 in 1990, remaining at that level for the next two decennial censuses (U.S. Census Bureau, 
2010). The construction of several federal buildings, including the FBI’s Criminal Justice 
Information Services Division and the United Hospital Center, helped reverse declines resulting 
from the moribund low-skill manufacturing and mining (Goetz et al., 2019). Additionally, 87.7% 
of Harrison County residents have at least a high school degree, and 21.6% attained a bachelor’s 
degree, placing the County in the top quartile for educational attainment within Appalachia and 
West Virginia (U.S. Census Bureau, 2016). Although Harrison County demonstrates a higher 
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rate of substance use mortality for males than the nation (29.5 per 100,000 residents versus 18.7), 
the state’s overall substance use mortality rate (34) exceeds the County’s rate (I.H.M.E., 2016). 
Likewise, while average life expectancy is lower than the nation’s (73.3 versus 76.7 for males in 
2014, a possible result of higher incidences of substance use, obesity, and smoking), Harrison 
County’s life expectancy matches the state’s average (73.6). Given these positive demographic 
trends, relative to McDowell County, I will analyze whether economic trends reflect consistent 
findings. 
Economic Trends 
 While Harrison County falls slightly behind the nation on income, poverty, employment, 
and labor force participation, it outperforms most Appalachian counties and demonstrates 
relatively high resilience to economic shocks. Harrison County’s per capita market income of 
$36,992, though only 81.5% of the country’s P.C.M.I., is more than double that of McDowell 
County and among the top 10% of Appalachia’s counties (U.S. Census Bureau, 2018). Despite 
the County’s 15.4% poverty rate in 2018, which is four points higher than the country’s, this 
number has improved considerably from a 1993 high of over 22%. According to 2018 data, 
Harrison falls within the top half of Appalachian counties. Correspondingly, the County’s 5% 
unemployment rate bests the majority of other counties in the region. As demonstrated by figure 
V, since the beginning of the twenty-first century, Harrison County’s unemployment rate has 
closely mirrored that of the United States, aside from a period of lower unemployment post-
recession. Most notably, according to figure VI, the County’s labor force size remained steady 
following the 2008 financial crisis, suggesting resilience to economic shocks. Until the 









Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics  
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In particular, the health and education sectors have steadily increased since the turn of the 
century without any declines since 2008 (Goetz et al., 2019). As such, Harrison County 
possesses a relatively healthy labor force participation rate of 58.6%, which falls within 
Appalachia’s top quartile (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2020). The case of Harrison County 
indicates that local development efforts to diversify economic activity and high levels of 
employment in health and education may successfully transition an economy away from one 
dependent on extractive industries.  
Resilient County Case Study: Chenango 
Background 
 Chenango County, a mostly rural area (83.4%), lies along the northern border of the 
congressionally-defined Appalachian region (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010). Unlike the 
aforementioned case studies, the area does not have a mining past. However, it historically relied 
on only two sectors—agriculture and manufacturing—for economic growth, much like 
McDowell and Harrison Counties’ reliance on a select few industries. The county seat, Norwich, 
enjoyed economic growth as a result of its manufacturing prowess (e.g., piano and carriage 
production) during the mid-nineteenth century (Smith, 1880). German, west of Norwich, relied 
principally on dairying, with several large farms and creameries located in the town’s center and 
surroundings. Although occupations in agriculture and manufacturing have ill-defined prospects, 
the County has managed to preserve these legacy sectors and diversify with the inclusion of food 
processing and financial services-based roles (Goetz et al., 2019). For instance, N.B.T. Bank, a 
growing financial institution in the northeast, is headquartered in Norwich along with several 
other major insurance agencies (100+ employees) (Commerce Chenango, 2020). Thus, 
Chenango County has a diversity index of 107.04, slightly higher than the national average 
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(Chmura Economics & Analytics, 2020). However, the County falls in the 94th percentile for 
relative occupational diversity and the 74th percentile for relative industry diversity (Center for 
Regional Economic Competitiveness, 2012). Like Harrison County, Chenango County comprises 
of two key occupational groups: management, business, science, and arts (33.2%), and sales and 
office-related work (20%) (U.S. Census Bureau, 2019).   
 Given the centrality of agriculture and manufacturing to the local economy, area-business 
groups and elected officials formed Commerce Chenango. This organization seeks to build the 
County’s resilience against shocks through a variety of initiatives, including grant and loan 
programs for businesses that build or renovate employment sites within the County. The group 
devised a six-pronged economic development plan in 2014 (Commerce Chenango, 2020) to 
accelerate the community’s diversification. Its specific goals include worker education and job-
specific training, development of the local tourism industry, business recruitment and retention 
initiatives. The plan also sets forth a number of action steps to analyze the County’s current 
assets, such as human capital, proximity to interstate highways, and educational and cultural 
institutions. In the years since the plan’s release, the County has enacted some of these strategies, 
emphasizing workforce retooling. For instance, the County provides financial support for 
workers engaged in training programs by offering childcare, transportation, and other auxiliary 
services to augment the program take-up rate (Goetz et al., 2019). The County also lobbied the 
local community college, Morrisville State College, to implement programs and mini-courses 
that train area-residents for local employers’ specific needs (Chenango Commerce, 2014). 
Having discussed the County’s concerted efforts to enhance resilience, I will analyze local 




 Although Chenango County’s population growth has slowed in recent decades, its above 
regional-average educational attainment levels, low drug abuse, and on-par-with-the-nation life 
expectancy, demonstrates that Chenango is a high performing Appalachian County. The 
County’s population peaked in 1990 at 51,768 residents, declining slightly to 50,477 in 2010 
(U.S. Census Bureau, 2010). This decline followed the closure of multiple manufacturing firms, 
chiefly specializing in food production and packaging (Chenango Commerce, 2014). The 
businesses either closed or relocated their manufacturing arms to lower-cost areas. Of this 
population, 86.9% have at least a high school education while 17.4% hold at least a bachelor’s 
degree, lower than Harrison County but greater than most Appalachian counties (placing 
Chenango in the 71st and 62nd percentiles, respectively) (U.S. Census Bureau, 2016). The mental 
and substance use disorder mortality for males, at 14.8 per 100,000 residents, is lower than both 
New York (17.6) and the nation (18.7) (I.H.M.E., 2016). Drug-related hospitalizations also best 
the state average with 19.3 per 10,000 residents recorded in Chenango County compared to 25.7 
across the state (New York Department of Health, 2010). Likewise, the life expectancy (78.1) 
surpasses 87% of Appalachian counties and is on par with the U.S.’ overall life expectancy for 
both gender groups (81 for females and 76.5 for males) (I.H.M.E., 2016). I will now evaluate 
whether Chenango County experiences similarly above-average economic trends, despite its 
slow population growth. 
Economic Trends 
 Like Harrison County, Chenango falls below national averages for income, poverty, 
employment, and labor force participation; however, for all categories except employment, 
Chenango places in Appalachian counties’ top quartile. With a per capita market income of 
 31 
$30,772, Chenango’s P.C.M.I. is nearly double that of McDowell and exceeds 76% of other 
counties in the region (U.S Census Bureau, 2018). Poverty levels are also relatively low at 
14.3%, below that of Harrison, McDowell, and 76% of Appalachian counties. Unemployment 
figures, however, are less exceptional, better than 56% of Appalachian counties. As reflected in 
figure VII, unemployment closely follows national trends. The differential between 
unemployment pre-recession and post-recession in Chenango County mirrors that of the nation. 













Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics  
However, because of Chenango County’s labor force size’s relative stability immediately 
before and after the Great Recession, an ARC (Goetz et al., 2019) report that relies upon Hans 
and Goetz’s resilience framework identifies Chenango as the 289th most resilient U.S. county. In 
the years succeeding the recession, the expansion of the advanced manufacturing sector has been 
primarily responsible for the County’s resilience. Chobani, an American-based food company, 
and Raymond Corporation, an international manufacturing firm, are two of the County’s largest 
employers that fueled post-recession growth. Indeed, manufacturing, the dominant sector in 
economic recovery, accounted for 59.4% of job growth. Furthermore, Chenango’s labor force 
participation falls within Appalachia’s top quartile at 58.4%, despite a declining civilian labor 
force size, demonstrating that a relatively high number of area residents contribute to the 
County’s output of goods and services (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2020). While the County 
must reverse the falling population and civilian labor force to preserve its resilient status, 
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Chenango’s demographic and economic trends reflect strength in a region plagued by high 
poverty levels.  
Discussion 
 There are several common themes that can be drawn from the outcomes of McDowell, 
Harrison, and Chenango Counties. First, all three areas fall beneath national averages on key 
factors, including employment, labor force participation, and poverty. Although Chenango and 
Harrison are transitional counties, they are still beleaguered by the same economic challenges 
that afflict the greater Northern and Central Appalachian regions. Both Central Appalachian 
counties must also contend with higher than national average drug abuse rates. The literature 
suggests a statistically significant relationship between substance abuse and labor force 
participation (French et al., 2001). In order to ameliorate high rates of nonemployment in 
Appalachia, further research will need to assess if a causal relationship exists between these two 
factors.  
Second, despite these issues, Harrison and Chenango Counties demonstrate far greater 
economic and occupational diversity than McDowell. Both areas have made concerted efforts to 
diversify their economies by offering employer incentive programs, and attracting federal and 
medical facilities (Harrison County), which provide relative stability in the face of sudden 
economic downturns. Private, nonprofit organizations have also encouraged diversification in the 
two counties. Kodryzcki and Munoz (2015), from their analysis of resurgent cities (former 
industrial areas that have adapted to post-industrial economies), find that the most successful 
economic development efforts occur in areas with private, non-profit organizations, like Healthy 
Harrison and Commerce Chenango. While Harrison and Chenango County historically relied on 
resource wealth as primary modes of economic activity, they have expanded into skilled 
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manufacturing and professional services sectors. McDowell, on the other hand, has made few 
meaningful to attempts to diversify, contributing to its long-run struggle to transition from its 
extractive industry-reliant economy.  
Third, Harrison and Chenango exceed regional averages in educational attainment for 
both high school and college graduation. This finding is in line with Goetz et al.’s (2019) study, 
which establishes a significant relationship between an area’s economic resilience and its 
education levels. Commerce Chenango has specifically developed an innovative partnership 
between local employers and schools to retrain workers with in-demand job skills. In the next 
section, I will consider the literature that evaluates the efficacy of direct public investment, local 
subsidies, and training programs, all of which are found in Harrison and Chenango Counties, as a 
means of place-based economic development. 
A Blueprint for Place-Based Economic Development  
Literature Review 
As this report has established, over the last few decades, the U.S. has stratified into 
regions of relative wealth and prosperity. Some economists and policy makers view place-based 
economic development initiatives as an important mechanism by which depressed regions can 
achieve parity with other parts of the nation (Austin et al., 2018; Bartik, 2019; Nunn et al., 2018)  
Place-based development programs have a rich history in the U.S. and other parts of the world, 
including the E.U. and U.K. While programs in the E.U. generally fall under the purview of  
“cohesion policy,” large-scale infrastructure projects that increase regional integration, the U.S. 
strongly relies upon enterprise zones, indirect benefits tightly targeted toward about 3,000 
metropolitan areas (Ehrlich and Overman, 2020). However, the U.S. also boasts large-scale 
infrastructure initiatives of its own with the Appalachian Regional Commission and Tennessee 
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Valley Authority. A robust economic literature has emerged to evaluate the efficacy of such 
programs both in the U.S and the E.U. I will examine the literature that studies direct public 
investments, local employment subsidies, location specific credits, and localized training as a 
means of achieving regional development. Some of the aforementioned policies have 
demonstrated more positive outcomes than others but, as Austin et al,. (2018) argue, place-based 
programs have the most potential for success when concentrated in areas that will have a 
significant behavioral response. They liken this rationale to findings from papers discussing 
policing policy. Whereas Vidal and Mastrobuoni (2018) discern little to no effect when police 
units are spread out equally over high-crime and low-crime areas, Braga, Papachristos, and 
Hureau (2014) find a statistically significant effect associated with place-based crime reduction 
(where units specifically target high-crime areas). This same logical framework is applied by 
advocates of place-based economic policy (Nunn et al., 2018). For instance, West Virginia has a 
high non-employment rate relative to Wyoming. Austin et al., (2018) find, based on their 
empirical analysis, that states like West Virginia have higher employment elastiticies and a 
greater optimal employment subsidy. Federal resources, therefore, will most efficiently be 
allocated toward areas with a highly elastic labor supply. The succeeding analysis of place-based 
policies is pertinent to my discussion of the Appalachian region, which suffers from endemically 
low labor force participation. Thus, I will evaluate the success of these initiatives based on their 
ability to positively affect labor market outcomes. 
Direct Public Investment 
The Appalachian Region boasts several of the U.S’ longest-standing and far-reaching 
direct public investment programs: the ARC and the Tennessee Value Authority (TVA). Unlike 
enterprise zones, which typically target specific metropolitan areas, these public investment 
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initiatives are directed toward larger depressed regions (i.e., Central Appalachia). This report has 
already discussed the ARC’s history and its positive outcomes. Jaworski and Kitchens (2016) 
analyze the impact of highway construction expenditures, which constituted two-thirds of the 
ARC’s budget. These highways increased local jobs by 5.2% and annual income by 1.3%, 
according to their analysis. Bartik (2019) equates this income growth to $13.7 billion (2018 
dollars). The TVA overlaps with portions of the ARC service area, encompassing all of 
Tennessee and parts of surrounding states (Alabama, Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi, North 
Carolina, and Virginia). The federally operated corporation primarily supports public 
infrastructure investment, namely into canals, dams, highways, and electrification (Bartik, 2019). 
Kline and Moretti (2014) study the long run effects of the TVA, concluding that the program was 
successful in expediting the region’s industrialization as well as providing well-paying 
manufacturing jobs. Since its founding in 1933, as part of the New Deal, they estimate that the 
program has generated over 250,000 jobs. They caution, however, that their analysis primarily 
focused on the period spanning from 1940 to 1960, a time at which the manufacturing sector 
enjoyed steady growth in the U.S. Likewise, Becker et al., (2010, 2012) test for the effects of 
similar direct investment programs in the E.U. They consider the E.U.’s structural funds 
program, which provides grant support for infrastructure investments in regions with declining 
economic growth. Becker et al., find a strong positive correlation between regions with targeted 
infrastructure investment and per capita GDP growth. While they fail to see an effect on 
employment, they hypothesize that their findings suggest greater regional productivity, with job 
creation likely increasing in the long-run. Indeed, research assessing both the Appalachian region 
and abroad suggests that infrastructure investment can equalize regional deficits in economic 
growth and employment outcomes. However, given that the Northern, Central, and Southern 
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Appalachian subregions have progressively diverged from one another, despite the presence of 
significant direct public investment expenditures, other place-based policy alternatives must be 
identified to address nonemployment on a more local level. 
Local Employment Subsidies 
In the late 1990s, “Empowerment Zones” represented an increasingly fashionable 
approach toward reversing the effects of poverty in the U.S., particularly in urban areas suffering 
from the effects of de-industrialization. This policy originated from an initiative undertaken by 
the Thatcher administration in the United Kingdom, the “Regional Selective Assistance” 
program (RSA), which targeted urban neighborhoods suffering from the throes of 
deindustrialization (Kline and Moretti, 2013). The E.U. earmarked which regions qualified as 
“Assisted Areas,” and the British government distributed the subsidies accordingly, offering 
incentives (i.e., grants and regulatory breaks) to encourage employer relocation to affected areas. 
Criscuolo et al., (2012) observe that a 10% investment subsidy generated a 1.3% fall in 
unemployment in the treated areas. They notably concede that positive outcomes were generally 
limited to circumstances where small firms (under 150 workers) were offered incentives. Larger 
firms took advantage of incentives without any meaningful changes to their employment levels 
or community investment. Criscuolo et al., reach these findings by exploiting changes to the 
E.U.’s definition of an “Assisted Area” from 1993 to 2000. This had the subsequent effect of 
shifting which areas the British government directed funding toward. The rigorous eligibility 
requirements defined by the E.U. differentiate the U.K.’s RSA program from the vast array of 
enterprise zones later established in the U.S. Unlike the U.K., the U.S. government cannot limit 
states’ ability to offer subsidies to businesses (Austin et al., 2018). 
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About a decade after the launch of the RSA program in the U.K., enterprise zones were 
established in the U.S. to provide targeted incentives for areas meeting a patchwork of certain 
poverty and unemployment criteria. “Empowerment Zones” were established by the federal 
government in 1993, though some local municipalities initiated similar programs in the 1980s. 
These enterprise zone policies can generally be organized into three categories: private 
investment incentives, labor incentives, and financing programs (McDonald, 1997). They 
generally target specific economically-distressed urban areas. Though widely studied, the 
consensus regarding the effects of such programs has been mixed at best, and some more 
recently published literature has soured on the economic returns of such programs. Kolko and 
Neumark (2010) study California’s enterprise zones and found no statistically significant effect 
on employment. Elvery (2009) conducts a similar study, focusing on enterprise zones in 
California and Florida. He fails to identify a positive employment effect. Ham et al., (2011), by 
contrast, use census tract-level data to conclude that both locally and federally established zones 
significantly affected labor market outcomes. Since then, Neumark and Young (2019) published 
an article attributing Ham et al.’s findings to faulty control groups and significant data errors. 
Neumark and Young independently assess these zones using a “before and after method” and 
relied on altered control tracks to ultimately disprove Ham et al.’s findings. Furthermore, 
Reynolds and Rohlin (2014) dispute outcomes found elsewhere, by suggesting that evidence of 
positive mean effects conceal important distributional factors. They conclude that Empowerment 
Zones attract high-income residents, boosting an area’s mean annual household income. In these 
same areas, however, they find a 1.1% increase in the individuals living in extreme poverty. 
Therefore, according to Reynolds and Rohlin’s work, Empowerment Zones do not necessarily 
ameliorate the impoverished circumstances of those living in poor areas. Evidently, both state 
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and federal enterprise zone policy efforts have failed to consistently demonstrate positive 
benefits—their success varies over time period and place. Future research will need to address 
the idiosyncracies of enterprise zone policies to understand the factors differentiating the few 
studies with positive job creation outcomes to those with negative outcomes. 
Individual Location-Specific Credits 
 While local employment subsidies attempt to attract employers to a local region, 
individual location-specific credits impel individuals to relocate to a specific area. Such subsidies 
can be offered at all levels of government; for instance, Norway offers tax incentives to citizens 
in less desirable northern regions as a concerted spatial policy (Austin et al., 2018). Furthermore, 
on a more local level, villages suffering from the effects of de-population in Southern Italy 
induce residents to relocate with virtually free housing and stipends. Similar programs in the 
U.S. have gained traction, spanning from Natchez, Mississippi to the state of Vermont, where 
individuals were offered $10,000 to move (Vermont Agency of Commercy and Community 
Development, 2020). However, these programs are largely in their infancy with little to no 
research evaluating their impacts given their small scale. As Austin et al., (2018) assert, 
encouraging people to relocate to an area with already high levels of nonemployment may only 
exacerbate a region’s nonemployment.  
 State taxes constitute a far more common example of location-specific credits, where 
certain states may attempt to spur tax-based migration because of relatively low taxes. Bakija 
and Slemrod (2004) identify a relationship between an in-flow of wealthy senior residents and 
low estate taxes. Akcigit et al., (2018) perform a case study of eight states, identifiying that state 
tax rates are a strong negative predictor of inventors’ in-migration decisions. This leads Akcigit 
et al., to conclude that individual location-specific tax credits have important implications for 
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local innovation. However, the literature suggests few other trends that can broadly be associated 
with tax-based migration, suggesting further research needs to explore the viability of individual 
location-specific credits as a means of spurring a region’s job growth (Austin et al., 2018). 
Customized Training Programs 
Place-based pre-professional and work-skill training programs have been discussed by 
developmental economists—including Austin et al., (2018) and Hausmann et al., (2013)—as 
pathways toward diversification, which mitigate poverty and unemployment. Rodrik (1996) 
asserts nations can fulfill one of three economic roles: highly skilled, high output; low skilled, 
low output; or a combination of the two. He claims that government investment in human capital 
is essential toward achieving a high output, diversified economy.  
Developmental economists have evaluated the impact of various skill-training programs 
throughout the country. Some programs, such as the Job Partner Act of 1982, have been 
implemented on a national level, targeted toward low-skill individuals in areas across the nation. 
Much like enterprise zones, other job-training programs operate at the state-level, where state 
officials decide which areas are eligible for job-training grants or classroom training programs. 
Bartik and Erickek (2014) analyze the research literature on economic development incentives: 
they conclude that generalized training programs offer mixed results but contend that targeted 
initiatives that teach in-demand skills yield more promising outcomes. Bartik (2019) postulates 
that subsidized job training through community college and university programs resolves several 
critical market failures. For instance, small firms may not have the resources or infrastructure to 
effectively train workers. They may also underinvest in training out of hesitation for expending 
resources on employees not committed to staying with the company. Moreoever, public agencies 
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screen which institutions receive funding, ensuring that workers are efficiently and properly 
trained.  
Neumark (2018), building off weak evidence for enterprise zones, argues in favor of a 
customized job training initiative through a detailed policy proposal, which he calls “Rebuilding 
Communities Job Subsidies” (RCJS). He advocates a two-phased approach, where the federal 
government fully subsidizes salaries of workers-in-training, after which workers transfer to 
private sector roles subsidized at a 50% rate by the government. While enrolled in these 
positions, workers will engage with developmental opportunities to expand their human capital. 
When supporting his proposal, he references earlier research from Hellerstein et al.,(2008), 
which demonstrates that the skill level of one’s network can effectively incentivize gainful 
employment in disadvantaged areas. Therefore, programs that expose non-employed individuals 
to networks with in-demand skills have the potential to generate positive employment outcomes. 
Caliendo and Schmidl (2016) find some positive effects associated with on-the-job training 
initiatives for youths in their assessment of Euopean countries, including higher employment 
take-up when work experiences are subsidized. Though they draw mixed results from the 
efficacy of job-training programs, Caliendo and Scmidl surmise that adverse economic 
conditions and imperfect balances of classroom and practical training drove the negative results. 
They find that job-training performed entirely in the classroom generates a clearer positive 
effect. In addition, studies they analyze have relatively short observation periods (ranging from 
only several months to two years). Card et al., (2018) consider a set of 207 studies, across 
different age groups, which offers more heartening support for human capital style training 
programs. They are able to assess the longer-term impact, finding that while the effects of job-
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training programs are negligible in the months after completion, a stronger positive relationship 
emerges following 2 to 3 years.  
Indeed, out of all of the place-based programs considered, technical re-education 
programs for adults offer the most consistently positive outcomes. Robins and Greenberg (1997) 
summarize findings from 14 voluntary training initiatives, finding the most significant positive 
effects on adult women’s earnings. While the programs had a less pronounced influence on adult 
men’s earnings, Robins and Greenberg observe earnings growth for men enrolled in the national 
voluntary training system, created under the Job Partner Act of 1982 (JTPA). However, Robins 
and Greenberg concede that the aggregate effects of JTPA are minimal, largely because of 
budgeting restrictions that limit the extent of the program’s outreach. Romero (2009) studies a 
similar program initiated in the U.K., “the New Deal for Communities,” by comparing treated 
neighborhoods with nearby but not adjacent neighborhoods. She discerns an increased likelihood 
of achieving full-time employment when residents are enrolled in job-skill training.  
Osterman (2006) argues that technically-oriented community college programs are an 
effective mechanism by which federal and state governments can subsidize job-training in 
distressed areas. Bahr (2019) finds positive and significant impacts for community college 
attendees who earned the majority of their credits in career and technical education (CTE), 
supporting Bartik and Ericeck’s (2014) finding that job training programs are most effective 
when targeted toward in-demand technical skills. In a recent study, Brunner et al., (2020) 
analyze the labor market outcomes of students attending CTE high school programs in 
Connecticut. They deduce that male students achieve 32% higher earnings than high school 
students in the control group. Moreover, Hollenbeck (2008) studies the impact of CTE public 
subsidies, identifying significant returns to a grant program implemented in Massachusetts: the 
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public cost of creating or retaining primary sector jobs was less than $9,000 per job, lower than 
the price of most development initiatives. Subsequent studies have evaluated labor market 
returns to community college degrees and find substantial value in incentivizing prime-age adults 
to pursue associate degrees and certificates. Jepsen, Troske, and Coomes’ (2014) analyze the 
returns on community college credentials for Kentucky students, finding that an associate degree 
yields quarterly returns of about $3,300 for females and $2,000 for males (2021 dollars). 
Likewise, Belfield, Liu, and Trimble (2014) observe that long-term certification programs have a 
positive return of $1,722 for females and $620 for males (2021 dollars). In contrast, an associate 
degree garners a return of approximately $2,098 for females and $1,246 for males.  
Summary 
This report has repeatedly emphasized the spatially heterogenous nature of both the U.S. 
and the Appalachian Region. Communities like Harrison and McDowell coexist in relative 
proximity to each other; despite this, as the case study analysis revealed, McDowell faces 
different and more foundational development issues. Therefore, a one size fits all approach is not 
sufficient for achieving intra-regional parity. While large-scale initatives like the ARC and TVA 
have found some success with their major infrastructural investments, the current state of 
Appalachia reveals that these programs cannot, by themselves, overcome negative migration and 
labor force participation trends. As the below table (table I.) demonstrates, other initiatives, 
including local employment subsidies and location specific credits, suffer from a lack of any 
broad agreement in the literature. By contrast, customized job training programs offer promising 
potential based on the labor market returns observed in diverse settings in the U.S. and abroad. 
Whereas some economists find positive effects (Ham et al., 2011), most fail to observe 
any effects and some even draw negative outcomes from U.S. enterprise and empowerment zone 
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programs (Kolko and Neumark, 2010; Reynolds and Rohlin, 2014). A factor that may contribute 
to the relative success of some employment subsidy programs in the U.K. is their relative 
scarcity compared with those in the U.S. Criscuolo et al. (2013) discern a positive and significant 
increase in employment with a similar initiative in the U.K., the RSA program. While RSA 
targets 71 impoverished urban areas across the country, the U.S. has a patchwork of nearly 3,000 
enterprise zones, which likely dampens the effect that any one zone may have in stimulating 
development. Nonetheless, the existing literature provides only equivocal evidence in support of 
local employment subsidies. Further research will need to identify what commonalities the 
successful programs share and whether this propensity for success can be realized in rural areas. 
Likewise, though some policy-makers have devised innovative location specific credit 
programs, the research on these programs remains sparse. Several studies evaluate whether 
credits alter migration patterns, by exploiting changes in state tax policy. They find that lower 
local taxes can induce in-migration. However, lowering tax rates does not, by itself, constitute 
meaningful economic development policy because inducing individuals to move to areas 
experiencing already high levels of non-employment may only enhance the problem (Bakija and 
Slemrod, 2004; Akcigit, 2014). 
The preceding literature review of place-based education programs strongly supports the 
position that human capital investment can yield economic development, especially in the long-
run. Customized job training programs offer the most consistent results in improving 
employment outcomes relative to the other considered place-based policies. The literature 
considers a diverse array of training initiatives, ranging from subsidized work experiences to 
classroom training. Perhaps surprisingly, classroom-skills learning engenders similar long-term 
effects to on-the-job training and, in some cases, generates even more significant returns than on-
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the-job initiatives (Caliendo and Schmidl, 2016; Card et al., 2018). In particular, CTE job 
training programs studied in both rural and urban settings reveal positive labor market returns, 
which has important implications for policy proposals that seek to address endemic 
nonemployment rates in Appalachia (Jepsen, Troske, and Coomes, 2014).  
Table I. 
Direct Public Investment 
Author  Name of Program Program Features  Effects 
Becker et al., (2010) Structural Funds 
(E.U.) 
Regions with GDP 
level below 75% of 
E.U. average qualify 
for structural fund 
grants 
Raised per-capita 
income by about 
1.8% compared to 
nearby regions (1989-
2006) 











over 250,000 jobs 
and raised 












Increased local jobs 
by 5.2% and annual 
income by 1.3% 
(1960 compared to 
1985, 2010) 
 
Local Employment Subsidies 
Author  Name of Program Program Features Effects 





zones both sought to 
achieve poverty 
reduction, principally 
through tax credits 
awarded to local 
businesses 
Zone residents less 
likely to be employed 
than residents of 
observationally 
similar areas 
(1970, 1980, 1990) 
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incentives to relocate 
to distressed urban 
areas and to hire from 
these areas 
No significant effect 
on employment 
(1992-2004) 
Ham et al., (2011) State Enterprise 
Zones and Federal 
Empowerment Zones 
(U.S.) 
State enterprise zones 
vary state-by-state 
but generally targeted 
for state tax 




provide tax incentives 
as well as tax-free 











(1980, 1990, 2000) 




Grants and regulatory 
breaks for employers 
locating or expanding 















provide tax incentives 







zones (1990, 2000) 
Neumark and Young 
(2019) 
State Enterprise 










(1980, 1990, 2000) 
 
Location Specific Credits 
Author  Name of Program Program Features Effects 
Bakija and Slemrod 
(2004) 
Diverging state estate 
and sales tax rates 
(U.S.) 
Changes in state tax 
policy exploited 
Estate and sales taxes 
reduce the probability 
of wealth senior 
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using federal estate 
tax return data   
individuals relocating 
to a jurisdiction 
(1965-1998) 
Akcigit (2018) Diverging state 





in different states 






Customized Training Programs 






Job Partner Act, 
Comprehensive 
Employment and 
Training Act) (U.S.) 
Remedial education 









earnings effect on 
women, modest for 
men, insignificant for 
youths (1964-1998) 




awarded to in-state 
organizations and 
companies 
Primary sector jobs 
created at cost of less 
than $9,000 per job 
and 2.8-8% estimated 
return to workers 
(1999-2006) 
Romero (2009) New Deal for 
Communities (U.K.) 
Job-training and full 
time education for 
individuals in 39 of 
the U.K.’s most 
deprived 
neighborhoods 
NDC increased the 
probability of 
employment for 
individuals living in 
NDC areas (2002-
2004) 



















Active Labor Market 
Programs (E.U.) 
Training courses, job 
assistance, subsidized 
employment, and 
public work programs 
for individuals in 
depressed areas 
Statistically 
significant effects for 
subsidized work 
experiences. Out of 






Card et al., (2018) Active Labor Market 
Programs (primarily, 
Australia, E.U., N.A., 
L.A.C., and U.K.)  
“Human capital” 
style job training 
programs and work 
first initiatives  
ALMPs have positive 
significant impacts on 
employment during 
periods of low 
growth and high 
unemployment (2007, 
2014) 





offered in fields that 
are closely linked 
with in-demand 
employment sectors 






over $1,000 in CTE 
fields (2002-2008) 
Brunner et al., (2020) Connecticut 
Technical High 
School System (U.S.) 
High school credits 
offered in courses 






exhibit 31% higher 
quarterly earnings, 
though no discernible 




Description of the Intervention 
Based on my qualitative analyses, I suggest a place-based proposal designed to explore 
the viability of a conditional, subsidized worker re-training program in Central Appalachia. This 
intervention proposes funding two-year degrees at West Virginian community colleges by 
allocating a total of $4,256,000 toward job-training scholarships. My recommendation to train 
workers through the community college system arises from the substantial literature that 
demonstrates the efficacy of CTE community college programs (Belfield, Liu, and Trimble, 
2014; Jepsen, Troske, and Coomes, 2014). The preponderance of the evidence supports 
classroom training as a productive mechanism by which to reskill workers (Card et al., 2018). 
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The treatment will target individuals residing in three of the state’s poorest counties—Gilmer, 
Clay, and McDowell (with a combined population of 39,000) (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010). The 
$4,256,000 award constitutes about .5% of these counties’ overall G.D.P. (Bureau of Economic 
Analysis, 2018). To receive a scholarship, individuals must agree to reside in West Virginia for 
four years after earning their community college credentials. The literature has suggested that the 
effects of such programs only become apparent after an evaluation period of at least 2 to 3 years 
(Card et al., 2018). The conditionality aspect is a core component of the program; while the 
preceding literature review already revealed significant and positive returns to job-training and 
technical community college education, no studies to my knowledge consider the out-migration 
choices of students once completing these job-training programs. Developing nations use a 
similar conditional model to attract their citizens studying internationally to return to their home 
countries upon graduation (Güngor and Tansel, 2012); however, the limited studies that calculate 
the effects of these programs fail to reach a consensus. Thus, this intervention will seek to assess 
how place-based training can slow the “brain drain” afflicting the Appalachian region.   
Only about 20% of West Virginians over 25 years old have a college degree, which is 
substantially lower than the 31.5% nationwide average (U.S. Census Bureau, 2018). Therefore, 
federal subsidization of job training programs for tradesmanship (i.e., plumbers, electricians, and 
carpenters), entrepreneurship, information technology, and other high wage professions for 
prime-age adults (ages 25 to 54) could offer a promising future for low-skilled Central 
Appalachian workers. However, education should not be mistaken as an antidote to the state’s 
and greater region’s economic woes. This report has discussed the damaging effects of the "brain 
drain" currently affecting the region, where young people pursuing higher education express an 
interest to leave: low wages, limited professional opportunities, low returns to investment, and 
 50 
low regionwide educational attainment fuel college students’ desire to leave Central Appalachia 
(Vazzana and Rudi-Polloshka, 2019). In Vazzana and Rudi-Polloshka’s case study of an 
Appalachian liberal arts college, they find that an Appalachian college graduate is substantially 
likelier to leave the state than a low-skilled individual. Furthermore, they claim an Appalachian 
with a college degree is 4 times more likely to relocate from the region than someone who has 
only completed their high school education. Therefore, policy proposals targeting professional 
development must also have a mechanism for limiting this exodus of high-skilled workers from 
the region. 
While low take-up has marred efforts to measure the efficacy of specific economic 
development initiatives (e.g., microloans), I anticipate a high take-up rate based on the limited 
literature evaluating conditional community college scholarships in the United States. For 
example, Barrow et al., (2012) recruited adults (aged 18 to 34) to assess the impact of a 
performance-based Louisiana community college scholarship with a sample goal of 1,000 
students. The recruiters exceeded their goal with a sample size of 1,019 and ceased their 
recruitment efforts after receiving an overabundance of interest. While this evidence is anecdotal 
and lacks established precedent in the literature, existing research suggests that the proposed 
intervention will satisfy my target sample size as long as the recruitment process is sufficiently 
straightforward (in contrast, for instance, to the Pell Grant’s complex application requirements) 
(Mani et al., 2015).  
Treatment Group 
I propose an intervention with a target sample size of 1,064, where 532 participants from 
Gilmer, Clay, and McDowell counties will be awarded $8,000 (the approximate average cost of a 
two-year degree from West Virginia community colleges) to enroll in a two-year-long associate 
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degree program (60 credits, 4 semesters) (U.S. News & World Report, 2020). These residents 
will be randomly selected from a pool that agrees to both partake in a West Virginian community 
college program and to live in the state of West Virginia four years after graduation; therefore, 
the unit of assignment for the treatment group will occur at an individual level, where consenting 
individuals randomly receive a full community college 2-year scholarship. Outcomes will also be 
measured individually. If participants in the treatment group breach their agreement by moving 
out-of-state, they will be required to pay the award amount in full, and their earnings outcome 
will be calculated as 0 following their out-migration.. Students in this group will be monitored 
from quarter 1 of the study until quarter 24 (six years total) to assess their earnings during 
enrollment and four years after graduation.  
Control Group 
The control group will comprise 532 randomly selected residents—the same number of 
individuals in the treatment group. At the onset of the six-year trial, these individuals will reside 
in the same three counties: Gilmer, Clay, and McDowell. As individuals in the treatment group 
are ages 25 to 54, residents in the control group must also fall within the same age-range at the 
start of the six-year evaluation period to ensure parity. Individuals in the control group are not 
bound to staying in the state of West Virginia for four years, unlike those in the treatment group. 
Therefore, those who move away from the state will no longer be evaluated and, thus, do not 
affect the state’s output for the remainder of the trial (unless they move back). 
Theory of Change 
Do recipients of publicly-funded scholarship programs demonstrate higher earnings 
outcomes than non-program recipients living in the same area? Moreover, if these programs 
generate returns for recipients, can they effectively disincentivize recipients from moving away 
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(i.e., the "brain drain)? Positive findings collected from CTE job training programs motivate the 
basis of the intervention: by earmarking the equivalent of .5% of Gilmer, Clay, and McDowell 
counties’ GDP to fund community college scholarships for residents, do I observe a higher, long-
run regional income?  
Ultimately, the underlying theory of change is that low-skill individuals, who receive 
scholarships to attend job-training community college programs, will contribute to better 
regional earnings outcomes. As this study analyzes six years-worth of data, individuals in both 
treatment and control groups will likely have higher earnings given their relative experience in 
the workforce (assuming employment). The program’s success will be measured by aggregating 
graduates’ earnings outputs over the four years following their graduation and comparing the 
earnings outputs of individuals who comprise the control group. This will help determine the 
effect, if any, of conditional job training scholarships.  
If the treatment group demonstrates statistically significant improved earning outcomes 
over the four years following graduation, this provides a potential future policy mechanism that 
can be expanded to narrow the divergence between Central Appalachia and other parts of the 
nation.  
Empirical Specifications 
I propose calculating treatment effects from the intervention by adhering to a similar 
framework as Bahr et al., (2015). This involves regressing outcome variables as dummies on the 
treatment arm (including a student’s award type and intended major), as well as demographic 
characteristics, and community college cohort effects. 
Yearnit = αit + β1treatmentit + β2intentit + gXit + rZit  + εit  
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The i subscript represents each person, such that one can evaluate members of the 
treatment and control groups individually. The t subscript represents a quarter, as individuals will 
be evaluated quarterly over the six years (24 quarters total). The dependent variable is a given 
earnings outcome for an individual in quarter t. TREATMENT represents the key variable: 
community college/technical school attendance, which is a dummy variable, that is equal to 1 
when enrolled and 0 when not. INTENT measures students’ intended area of study (CTE versus, 
non-CTE). The omitted category is the control group, which has not received any type of award. 
The vector X is a series of student-level covariates, including age, race, educational level, 
income bracket, and employment status. The vector Z accounts for school cohort fixed effects. 
Finally, the error term, ε, comprises hard-to-measure variables, including the effort that each 
recipient exerts while in the program (presumably, those who exert low effort will realize low or 
statistically insignificant returns) and their ability to find a job following graduation. 
Outcomes  
This intervention’s primary outcome is the change in earnings associated with a 
conditional scholarship award for a certification or associate program. While I acknowledge that 
both groups will demonstrate some earnings growth (controlling for inflation) over the four years 
because of work experience and subsequent promotions, this proposal evaluates whether there is 
a significant differential in average earnings between the two groups. If there is an observed 
improvement in the treatment group’s earnings compared to the control group, the calculated 
change can be attributed to conditional community college or technical school scholarships. 
I will also explore potential secondary effects resulting from my intervention. For 
instance, Glaeser and Saiz (2004) analyze the impact of increasing human capital within a 
locality, finding substantial spill-over effects. Skilled workers attract other skilled workers, 
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leading to population increases in high-human capital areas. The scope of this initiative is too 
small to observe any statistically significant impact. However, if scholarship recipients realize 
higher earnings following completion of their certificate or degree, this may encourage other 
community members to enroll in job-training programs after witnessing their neighbors’ 
enhanced earning potential. Much of the research that discusses human capital spillovers only 
considers high-skilled and low-skilled urban areas. If the primary impact is successfully 
observed, future research should consider the extent to which such spill-over effects exist in rural 
locations. 
The intervention may have an additional secondary effect where conditional scholarship 
recipients demonstrate greater persistence in their job roles following program completion. This 
principle is rooted in the psychology of sunk costs (Arkes, 1985). An individual has a greater 
tendency to exert effort into an endeavor once one has already invested their time to a cause. In 
the context of this intervention, individuals in the treated group invest two years’ worth of time 
into their reskilling and job training. Thus, individuals in the treatment group may witness higher 
long-run earnings than those in the control group partially because of this effect. Therefore, a 
potential issue will be separating out these effects from the effects, if any, of technically-oriented 
job training.  
Future Research 
 While the proposed initiative would reveal important findings about the direct effects of a 
place-based conditional community college scholarship, a larger initiative is eventually 
necessary to capture the effect of increasing human capital in a region. The ultimate goal of this 
policy is to change places not people. A larger intervention would reveal whether such a program 
attracts more employment and opportunity to a distressed area. Therefore, in order to capture 
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these equilibrium effects, I recommend further research that randomizes scholarship awards at 
the site level. For instance, if the program were broadened to include the state of West Virginia, 
the state’s 20 community colleges would be randomly assigned to the treatment and control 
groups. Fryer (2014) overcomes challenges associated with analyzing a small sample of schools 
by employing matched pair-randomization, where he finds the pairs of candidates that are most 
similar across a set of variables (e.g., average test scores and total enrollment) and then 
randomizes within each pair of schools. Instead of assessing individual income and employment, 
each school’s average income and employment outcomes would be evaluated before and after 
the intervention to determine if there exists a divergence between the treatment and control 
groups. The findings from both experiments would, hence, provide a holistic evaluation of the 
individual and community-wide impact of a conditional place-based scholarship program. 
Conclusion 
The first portion of this report considered the history of the Central Appalachian region 
and hypothesized that the area’s historical economic development challenges are at least partially 
explained by the resource curse phenomenen. While coalmining is no longer a viable source of 
income for most communities in Central Appalachia, the industry’s significance to the economy 
and, to a smaller extent, the region’s culture can still be traced to present-day. The McDowell 
County case study proves that some counties still depend on resource extraction as a primary 
means of economic activity; these areas’ failure to diversify and transition to other industries has 
undoubtedly contributed to their distressed status. My analysis also revealed that the resource 
curse explanation does not holistically describe Central Appalachia’s present-day status. Low 
labor force participation rates and low education levels have long defined the region even in 
areas without coal-mining; however, bright spots have emerged based on the study of Harrison 
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and Chenango counties. Though neither county identified a panacea to economic decline, they 
have established strategic development plans to diversify their respective workforces: Harrison 
transformed itself into a fulcrum for government and medical employment, whereas Chenango 
expanded into advanced manufacturing and financial services to drive growth.  
Central Appalachia’s plight is not unique. The increasing popularity of renewable energy 
in the United States will have a profound impact on fossil-fuel towns across the country, from 
the shale fields of Pennsylvania to the oil fields of Texas. Consequently, my research design may 
have important implications for low-skill, low-income workers in rural Central Appalachia and 
potentially other resource-dependent regions of the United States.  The intervention could 
contribute to the growing body of literature that suggests targeted job-training programs generate 
significant returns compared to other economic development initiatives (e.g., Federal 
Empowerment Zones) (Bahr et al., 2015; Jepsen, Troske, and Coomes, 2014). The conditionality 
aspect of my proposal is designed to incentivize individuals to stay within Central Appalachia 
and to prevent the noted “brain drain.” Ultimately, this intervention will provide important 
insight into place-based education policy’s ability to unify a nation with hardening boundaries 
between high-skill, coastal cities and left-behind, Central Appalachia. Despite Central 
Appalachia’s generally distressed status, the likes of Harrison and Chenango Counties prove the 
feasibility of transitioning from primary sectors of economic activity (mining, lumber, farming, 
etc.). As such, with the implementation of place-based, targeted programs, akin to the workforce 
development proposal discussed in this report, Central Appalachia may one day achieve 
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